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The behaviour related approach to dealing with occupational safety and health (OSH) 
has been shown to be valuable and as a result many construction organisations 
employ this method to achieve robust safety management systems. Behaviour-based 
safety (BBS) has various elements and comes in different forms and designs; and 
different organisations pay more attention to different elements. As a result, 
organisations typically give their behaviour-based safety programmes (BBSP) 
different names and pride themselves for achieving high safety standards because of 
the aspects of behavioural safety that they focus on. However, it is unclear as to which 
specific aspects of such programmes are the keys to success and which are of 
secondary importance to improving OSH. This paper presents the findings of a desk 
study of the top 100 UK and USA construction organisations (contractors and 
consultants) ranked by turnover; this involved a comparative analysis of BBSPs that 
led to the development of seven major themes. This study reveals the need to 
encourage smaller companies to undertake BBS as well as understand employees’ 
ideals so that they can be effectively and efficiently supported. This study is part of a 
three-year doctoral research programme that investigates the human aspect of OSH. 
Keywords: behaviour-based health and safety, construction, safety behaviour, safety 
performance. 
INTRODUCTION 
The behaviour-based approach to dealing with occupational safety and health (OSH) 
issues, which is recognised as behaviour-based safety (BBS), is known to be effective 
in reducing accidents that cause harm, and incidents which do not cause harm but 
have the potential to (Krause et al. 1999). Figure 1 shows Pybus’ (1996) evolution of 
safety culture model, which helps to contextualise the importance of the relationship 
between behaviour and safety performance.  
Pybus’ model postulates that safety culture starts from the ‘traditional’ phase where 
rules, enforcement and individuality dominate. This helps to reduce accidents but is 
limited in its effectiveness; hence the rate of reduction of accidents/incidents plateaus. 
The ‘transitional’ phase then places an emphasis on the importance of engineering 
controls and safety management systems; helping to reduce accidents further until 
another plateau is reached. Finally the innovative phase, where trust in people and 
being proactive are seen to be essential in order to further reduce accidents, is 
generated. In this phase, people are key elements and their behaviours become crucial 
in enhancing safety performance. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of safety, adapted from Pybus (1996) 
It is important to note that the features of the earlier phases must continue to be 
applied along with the emphases of the newer phase. Other similar but slightly 
different models exist (Hudson 2007). However, they all seem to converge on the 
position that a more humanistic approach to safety is the way to further enhance safety 
performance. 
Various organisations have implemented BBSPs and different studies have shown its 
effectiveness, for example Sulzer-Azaroff and Austin (2000). However, BBSPs exist 
in various designs and forms and there is a gap in knowledge regarding the elements 
of BBSPs that organisations currently rely on to improve safety performance. This 
paper therefore explores construction organisations’ BBSPs as presented on their 
company websites. The study explored BBSPs to discover emerging themes, 
differences and similarities between such safety programmes. More emphasis is 
placed on the safety aspect of OSH as it costs the UK economy more (Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) 2014).  
SAFETY BEHAVIOUR: FIRST OR LAST LINE OF DEFENCE? 
Reason (2009) argues that human acts are a primary cause of accidents; these acts are 
sometimes intentional and other times, unintentional. Garlapati et al. (2013) buttress 
this and argue that unsafe behaviours cause most of the accidents in the oil and gas 
sectors. It therefore follows that, if wrong acts can be reduced, accidents will be 
reduced as well. HSE (2009) claims that, on one hand, people make calamitous 
choices despite their awareness of the risks and on the other hand, their interpretations 
of risks may be flawed. They warn against focussing solely on human behaviour 
arguing that this is only one factor that affects safety amongst a raft of other factors. 
Therefore, it should not be treated as the only solution but rather as a part of an 
effective OSH management system. 
Anderson (2005) approaches this matter from a slightly different angle arguing that 
there are two causes of accidents. One is the direct cause and the other is an 
underlying or fundamental cause that is further away but has an impact on the 
accident. Reason (2009) is of the same opinion that many accidents are caused as a 
result of organisational factors, which can influence unsafe acts. He argues that unsafe 
acts can essentially be viewed as a consequence of poor organisational factors and 
maintains that human conditions cannot be changed but the circumstances in which 
they work can be. Figure 2 explains Reason’s (2009) model. 
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Figure 2: Accident causation prototype, adapted from Reason (2009) 
Reason (2009) asserts, like Hopkins (2006b), that there are latent condition pathways 
that can result in an accident without any direct acts as shown in Figure 2. He further 
explained that causes of accidents (‘a’ in Figure 2) should be considered starting from 
the organisational factors through the site-specific factors (“local conditions”), which 
Gibb et al. (2006) term “shaping factors” in their ConCA accident causality model, 
and finally the unsafe acts; whilst the direction of the investigation of accidents (‘b’ in 
Figure 2) should be the reverse starting from the unsafe acts. 
HSE (2009) agrees with Reason and Hopkins adding that active failures have instant 
repercussions while latent failures may not be instantly obvious. Active failures are 
caused by frontline staff like ground workers, labourers and painters whilst latent 
failures are usually caused by management staff such as managers, directors and 
designers. Some examples of active failure include disobeying traffic rules on site, not 
using personal protective equipment (PPE) when required and reversing without a 
vehicle banksman. Some examples of latent failures include inadequate training, poor 
communication, inadequate supervision and poor safety procedures. BBS tries to 
resolve both types of failures though HSE (2009) claims that latent failures are 
regularly concealed and are potentially worse than active failures.  
Figure 3 shows Heinrich's (1931) somewhat simplistic view of the relationship 
between fatalities and unsafe acts and conditions. The model focuses on the active 
failures and suggests that fatalities can be reduced and perhaps eliminated if unsafe 
acts and conditions are eliminated.  
 
Figure 3: Relationship between safety behaviour and fatalities, adapted from Heinrich (1931) 
HSE (2009) explains that unsafe acts can be either “errors” or “violations”. They 
define human error as “an action or decision which was not intended, which involved 
a deviation from an accepted standard, and which led to an undesirable outcome”, 
while a violation is defined as “a deliberate deviation from a rule or procedure”. As 
safety behaviour can ultimately make or break OSH systems (Reason 2009), it 
consequently becomes important to understand the motivating factors that drive the 
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‘right’ behaviours whilst reducing errors and violations. There seems to be advantages 
in combining Pybus’ (1996) model in Figure 1 and Reason’s (2009) model in Figure 2 
(following the approach of Gibb et al. 2006). Reason’s (2009) Swiss cheese model has 
been adapted in Figure 4 to show how this combination will work. 
 
Figure 4: Combination of Pybus’ and Reason’s models 
Figure 4 shows the positional relationship of the traditional, transitional and 
innovative phases of the Pybus model; parallels can be drawn with the Reason model. 
The traditional phase parallels organisational factors, the transitional phase parallels 
site-specific factors and the innovative phase parallels unsafe acts and conditions. 
Figure 4 also shows that there can be multiple causes of an accident and the latent and 
active pathways to failure postulated by Reason (2009) somewhat explains this. It 
must be acknowledged that accident causality is a complex matter and it is difficult to 
envisage a simplistic solution for it (Haslam et al. 2003). The arrow that runs through 
each of the plates illustrates an accident path and an accident occurs when all the holes 
in all the plates line up. If the organisational and site-specific conditions improve, the 
amount of accidents that materialise are likely to reduce as more holes in the first two 
plates will be blocked, inevitably cutting off some accident paths. Whether to tackle 
the traditional (organisational) or the innovative (unsafe acts and conditions) phase 
first is arguable, however literature suggests that tackling safety behaviours tends to 
be a last line of defence in practice. 
METHODOLOGY 
This exploratory study sought to uncover current practice in the construction industry 
regarding BBS. The websites of 400 organisations were reviewed to extract their 
safety content, which gives an indication of their safety practices. It is appreciated that 
organisations are able to place whatever they deem fit on their web pages therefore 
they may boast of success that they do not have. Also, they may claim to have good 
BBSPs even if they have none whatsoever; winning more work, being current and 
remaining competitive are some reasons why a company may do so. In any case, 
falsely boasting of BBS gives it more credit, as organisations do not normally 
associate themselves with anything that will bring their reputation down. 
The top 100 companies in 2014, ranked by turnover, as listed by Building.co.uk and 
ENR.construction.com in the UK and USA respectively were considered, as shown in 
Table 1. The top companies tend to be the leaders of the industry that the smaller 
companies follow. These companies subcontract work to smaller companies, who 
often have to meet the requirements already set (by the top companies). 
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Table 1:Breakdown of the sample size of 400 construction companies 
Region Contractors Consultants Total 
UK-based companies (Building.co.uk) 100 100 200 
US-based companies (ENR.construction.com) 100 100 200 
Both UK and US-based companies 200 200 400 
Gathering and analysing the data 
Companies’ names were searched using Google and their websites were accessed. 
Their health and safety (H&S) sections were scanned thoroughly to comprehend their 
contents; any points found on behaviour-based safety/behavioural safety were noted. 
It was found that most of the UK organisations called this kind of safety programme 
‘behavioural safety’ whilst most of the USA organisations called it ‘behaviour-based 
safety’. Many organisations positioned their safety content under the ‘Corporate 
Social Responsibility’ (CSR) or ‘Sustainability’ sections and many others had theirs 
under the ‘Who we are’ or ‘Our core values’ sections. This suggests that whilst some 
organisations treat safety as a responsibility that is externally bestowed on them or one 
that they bestow on themselves, others believe that safety is a value of their 
organisation; not an extra responsibility but simply the way they work. 
After all the readily accessible safety information was gathered, the companies’ own 
search engines were used to check for more safety information to identify any 
additional relevant safety information. For companies that did not have H&S sections 
and or where nothing was found on H&S, their search engines were used to explore 
further. Searches on ‘safety’, ‘health and safety’, ‘safety behaviour’, ‘behaviour and 
safety’, ‘behavioural safety’ and finally ‘behaviour-based safety’ were conducted. The 
same was done for the USA companies with the adaptation of the spelling of the word 
‘behaviour’ to ‘behavior’. To ensure equity across the sample, only the first pages of 
each of the results were given attention. 
The websites of group companies were reviewed as well as that of their individual 
subsidiaries and it was found that, for some, different subsidiaries had different names 
associated with their BBSPs. After reviewing the results and going through the 
relevant content from the links generated by the search, the companies’ names were 
typed in the Google search engine again but this time succeeded by the words 
‘behavioural safety’ and ‘behavioral safety’ for UK and USA respectively; the same 
was done with ‘behaviour-based safety’ and ‘behavior-based safety’. As with the 
website search, only the first pages of each of the results were considered. This 
secondary search conducted with Google was undertaken because it was found that 
some organisations had poorly built internal web search engines that did not produce 
relevant results to searches made. From the searches made, organisations’ BBSPs 
were identified and noted along with text pertaining to safety and behaviour. 
A mind map was used initially to synthesize the text and subsequently, a computer 
aided qualitative data analysis software – NVivo (version 10.2.0) was used to code the 
text, and emerging themes were identified. Pairing and elimination of themes 
subsequently helped to narrow the data down, and finally the themes were placed 
under higher order themes. Braun and Clarke (2006), Bryman (2012) and Saunders et 
al. (2012) best describe this form of analysis as a thematic one.  
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FINDINGS 
Prevalence of BBSPs 
Table 2 shows the number of construction organisations whose websites indicate that 
they have BBSPs in comparison to those that do not. 
Table 2: Number of companies with and without BBSPs (sample size=400) 
 UK 
Contractors 
UK 
Consultants 
USA 
Contractors 
USA 
Consultants 
Total 
BBSP 22 8 22 18 70 
No BBSP 77 92 76 82 327 
No website/website issues 1 0 2 0 3 
Total 100 100 100 100 400 
 
It is evident that most organisations do not have BBSPs, which is surprising given the 
emphasis in the literature and the media over recent years. This may suggest that 
many of the organisations in the sample do not know about the behavioural approach 
to dealing with safety. It is also possible that some organisations have such 
programmes but do not want to reveal the contents of their programme, perhaps to 
hide their flaws or for competitive reasons. Further, companies may be of the opinion 
that the return on investment of such programmes is low, although Cooper (2010) 
claims that the opposite is the case. 
Figure 5 shows that BBS engagement increases with an increase in turnover.  
 
Figure 5: Relationship between contractors/consultants’ turnover and BBS engagement 
The relationship between turnover and BBS engagement is directly proportional for 
construction organisations in both the UK and USA; further investigation into these 
organisations will help clarify why this is the case. Figure 5 suggests that most people 
in the UK’s construction industry do not avail of BBS since small-medium 
organisations (SMEs) hold the majority of its industrial sector (based on employment) 
(DBIS 2014). The USA consultants’ graph was not plotted, as the individual revenues 
for these companies were not available, though the trend remains the same. The graph 
shows that contractors in both countries engage with BBS more than consultants; one 
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possible reason for this is the notion that clients expect contractors to be more safety 
aware as they are at the ‘sharp’ end of accident causation. Further, contractors 
themselves may deem it necessary to improve their OSH management systems 
substantially, perhaps to win more work or because they genuinely care for employees 
to be safe. 
Key themes emerging from current BBSPs 
A word frequency query was performed on the entire data set using NVivo. The first 
(bbsp), second (behaviours) and third (safety) words generated were expected as these 
are generic terms. 
‘Zero’ was the fourth on the list. Many organisations have ‘zero’ in the title of their 
BBSPs, for example ‘beyond zero’, ‘zero harm’, ‘zero incidents’ and ‘target zero’. 
According to Wilkins (2011), zero accident cultures have become increasingly 
popular in the construction industry. Sherratt (2014) argues that zero target 
programmes may encourage people’s commitment to safety, however they may also 
have a counterproductive effect if people believe that it is an impossible target. 
‘Culture’, ranked fifth, appears to be a significant tool that companies rely on to 
ameliorate OSH. The term “safety culture” can be used to describe the behavioural 
elements (what people do) and the situational elements (what the organisation has) of 
an organisation (Human Engineering 2005). Cooper (2002) argues that good safety 
culture can help to reduce accidents and injuries, ensure that enough attention and 
regard is given to safety, ensure members of a company understand and share beliefs 
about risks, accidents and safety and increase people’s commitment to safety. Hudson 
(2007) argues that safety culture metamorphoses through 5 stages from ‘pathological’, 
through ‘reactive’, ‘calculative’, ‘proactive’ and finally the ‘generative’ stage. 
The culture within an organisation can be different and fragmented (Richter and Koch 
2004). Martin (2002) concurs with this view arguing that the superiors within an 
organisation ought to aim to align these fragments such that they are in agreement 
with the corporate culture of the organisation. On the other hand, Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2007) argue that integrated cultures do not deal with uncertainty as well as 
fragmented cultures, which are more flexibility. They report that High Reliability 
Organisations are more resilient because many of them have flexible cultures. 
Hopkins (2006a) suggests that culture and climate are occasionally used 
interchangeably. The authors’ previous work suggests that safety culture is different 
from safety climate (Talabi et al. 2015). They argue that culture is a deep-rooted 
quality, which is usually influenced by senior management while various 
organisational actors (internal and external) influence climate. It therefore follows that 
whilst many organisations refer to culture, they may indeed be referring to climate. 
Garlapati et al. (2013) argue that climate is equally important, as it is a medium 
through which greater performance can be achieved. 
‘Compliance’ also emerged many times which implies that many organisations are 
still focused on complying with legislation and indeed, many focus on the 
requirements of British Standard (BS) OHSAS 18001 (Occupational Health and 
Safety Assessment Series), which is a framework used to assess and audit OSH 
management systems. Previous work undertaken by the authors suggests that whilst 
legislation has undoubtedly reduced accidents, the problem with mere compliance is 
that the amount of accidents that occur in the construction industry is still 
unacceptable and safety performance seems to be plateauing (Talabi et al. 2015). 
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Some other words emerging with high frequency counts include leadership, 
communication, commitment, engagement, attitude, and awareness, which have all 
been discussed in past studies (Fernández-Muñiz at el. 2012 and Flin et al. 2008).  
Figure 6 highlights seven higher order themes, which all have broader elements that 
organisations associate with BBS.  
 
Figure 6: Factors currently used by construction companies to improve OSH  
These themes were methodologically organised and categorised based on their 
definition and significance; after several iterations, the figure evolved. ‘Personal 
values’ relate to attributes that make people trustworthy and reliable, ‘behaviour-based 
competencies’ relates to people’s competence, ‘organisational responsibilities’ are the 
fundamental duties of a company, ‘behaviour modification techniques’ suggest 
methods by which behaviours can be altered, ‘personal convictions’ are drivers that 
nudge people to choose to behave safely, ‘behaviour-based transition’ is the direction 
in which organisations that currently utilise BBS are moving and ‘behaviour 
modification tools’ are practical ways by which behaviours can be changed. 
Most of these higher order themes are behaviour oriented however one of them – 
‘organisational responsibilities’ is more structural. This finding is in line with research 
that suggests that BBS should not be used as a ‘one fits all’ solution but rather as part 
of a comprehensive OSH management system (HSE 2009; Reason 2009; Hopkins 
2006b; Anderson 2005; DeJoy 2005). The broader elements of this higher order theme 
appear to be largely covered by UK legislation whereas the broader elements of the 
others are not covered in the same way. 
Interestingly, out of the entire sample of 400 companies, only one company (in the 
USA) specified that it wanted its employees to return home better than the way they 
came to work. Many of the others specified that they wanted their employees to leave 
the same way they came and this is admirable in itself, however it is recommended 
that more companies should aspire to ensure that their employees leave work safer and 
healthier than when they arrived. It appears that more needs to be done to show 
genuine care and concern for employees in the construction industry. People’s safety 
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and health ought to be valued more and employers should strive to ensure that their 
employees return home from work physically, mentally and emotionally better than 
when they arrived. Straker and Mathiassen (2010) argue that organisations are more 
competitive when work is designed to achieve this.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The findings of this study have been classified into seven groups, which companies 
that currently practice BBS pay attention to: personal values, behaviour-based 
competencies, organisational responsibilities, behaviour modification techniques, 
personal convictions, behaviour-based transition and behaviour modification tools. 
Two important classifications emerge from this study: individual values and 
organisational values. This implies that organisations should critically assess 
employees’ ideals and nurture an environment that allows individuals to align their 
values with its own. However, they must be aware that this is a development and not 
the end. This study also suggests that organisations that currently endeavour to do this 
are in the minority; therefore more companies are urged to adopt BBS. Further, this 
study suggests that contractors appear to utilise BBS more than consultants. Further 
research into other industries to investigate whether there is agreement or 
disagreement with the construction industry is encouraged; lessons can be learnt and 
transferred among various industries. The next phase of this study will explain why 
the construction industry focuses on these aspects of BBS. 
REFERENCES 
Anderson, M (2005) Behavioural safety and major accident hazards: Magic bullet or shot in 
the dark? “Process Safety and Environmental Protection”, 83(2), 109–116. 
Braun, V and Clarke, V (2006) Using thematic analysis in psychology. “Qualitative Research 
in Psychology”, 3(2), 77–101. 
Bryman, A (2012) “Social research methods”. 4ed. Oxford University Press. 
Cooper, D (2010) The return on investment of the B-BS process. “Giornale italiano di 
medicina del lavoro ed ergonomia”, 32(1), A15–A17. 
Cooper, D (2002) Safety culture: a model for understanding and quantifying a difficult 
concept. “Professional Safety”, 47(6), 30–36. 
Department for Business and Skills (DBIS) (2014) “Business population estimates for the UK 
and regions 2014”. Statistical release, Ref – URN 14/92, 1-19. 
DeJoy, D M (2005) Behavior change versus culture change: Divergent approaches to 
managing workplace safety. “Safety Science”, 43(2), 105–129. 
Fernández-Muñiz, B, Montes-Peón, J M and Vázquez-Ordás, C J (2012) Safety climate in 
OHSAS 18001-certified organisations: antecedents and consequences of safety 
behaviour. “Accident Analysis and Prevention”, 45, 745–58. 
Flin, R, O’Connor, P and Crichton, M (2008) “Safety at the sharp end: A guide to non-
technical skills”. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Garlapati, A, Siddiqui, N and Al-Shatti, F (2013) Behavioral study of diverse workforce 
towards various health, safety and environment engagement strategies in upstream oil 
and gas industries. “International Journal of Scientific and Engineering Research”, 
4(7), 1768–1779. 
Geller, E S (2011) Psychological science and safety: Large-scale success at preventing 
occupational injuries and fatalities. “Current Directions in Psychological Science”, 
20(2), 109–114. 
Talabi, Gibb and Edum-Fotwe 
 
 
Gibb, A G F, Haslam, R, Gyi, D, Hide, S and Duff, R (2006) What causes accidents? 
“Proceedings of ICE - Civil Engineering”, 46–50. 
Haslam, R A, Hide, S A, Gibb, A G F, Gyi, D E, Atkinson, S, Pavitt, T C, Duff, R and Suraji, 
A (2003) “Causal factors in construction accidents”. Health and Safety Executive, 
HSE Report, RR 156. Sudbury: HSE Books. 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (2014) “Health and safety in construction in Great Britain, 
2014”. 1–15. 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (2009) “Reducing error and influencing behaviour”. 
Sudbury: HSE Books. 
Heinrich, H W (1931) “Industrial accident prevention: A scientific approach”. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Hopkins, A (2006a) Studying organisational cultures and their effects on safety. “Safety 
Science”, 44, 875–889. 
Hopkins, A (2006b) What are we to make of safe behaviour programs? “Safety Science”, 
44(7), 583–597. 
Hudson, P (2007) Implementing a safety culture in a major multi-national. “Safety Science”, 
45(6), 697–722. 
Human Engineering (2005) “A review of safety culture and safety climate literature for the 
development of the safety culture inspection toolkit”. HSE Books. 
Krause, T, Seymour, K and Sloat, K C (1999) Long-term evaluation of a behavior-based 
method for improving safety performance: a meta-analysis of 73 interrupted time-
series replications. “Safety Science”, 32(1), 1–18. 
Martin, J L (2002) “Organizational culture: Mapping the terrain”. Calif.: SAGE. 
Pybus, R (1996) “Safety Management: Strategy and Practice”. Oxford: Butterworth-
Heinemann. 
Reason, J (2009) “Managing the risks of organizational accidents”. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Richter, A and Koch, C (2004) Integration, differentiation and ambiguity in safety cultures. 
“Safety Science”, 42(8), 703–722. 
Saunders, M, Lewis, P and Thornhill, A (2012) “Research methods for business students”. 
6ed. Lewis, P and Thornhill, A (Eds). Harlow: Pearson. 
Sherratt, F (2014) Exploring “Zero Target” safety programmes in the UK construction 
industry. “Construction Management and Economics”, 32(7-8), 737–748. 
Straker, L, Mathiassen, S E (2009) Increased physical workload in modern work – a necessity 
for better health and performance? “Ergonomics”, 52(10), 1215-1225. 
Talabi, B, Edum-Fotwe, F and Gibb, A (2015) Construction actor safety behaviour: 
Antecedents, current thinking and directions. In: Smith, S and Sherratt, F (Eds.), 
“Proceedings of ARCOM Doctoral Workshop: Health, Safety and Wellbeing”, 11 
February 2015, University of Edinburgh, 9–20. 
Weick, K E and Sutcliffe, K M (2007) “Managing the unexpected: Resilient performance in 
an age of uncertainty”. 2ed. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Wilkins, J R (2011) Construction workers’ perceptions of health and safety training 
programmes. “Construction Management and Economics”, 29, 1017–1026. 
